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BOOK REVIEW
ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO HIDE: SEXUAL
ASSAULT AND SILENCE IN HOLLYWOOD AND
THE LAWYERS WHO LET IT HAPPEN
Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies, and a Conspiracy to Protect
Predators. By Ronan Farrow. Little, Brown and Company. 2019.
Pp. 464. $26.99. ISBN-10: 0316486639; ISBN-13: 9780316486637.
Reviewed by Neil Fulton*
Hollywood stars and moguls, sexual misconduct and harassment, investigative journalism, espionage, and unethical lawyer conduct—all this
and more is on display in Ronan Farrow’s Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies, and a
Conspiracy to Protect Predators. Working for NBC News and then The New
Yorker, Farrow investigated allegations of serial sexual assault by Harvey
Weinstein. He readily found women who said they had been assaulted by
Weinstein, but getting those stories to the public required navigating an obstacle course of non-disclosure agreements, corporate legal departments, unethical conduct by Weinstein’s legal team, and even being followed by spies.
In the end, however, Farrow got these women’s stories out and found serial
sexual misconduct in other high-profile places. Catch and Kill provides a
fascinating lens to think about professional responsibility, corporate governance, how the law responds to sexual misconduct, and the boundaries of contract law.

Neil Fulton is the fourteenth dean of the University of South Dakota School of Law. He
received his B.A. from Yale and his J.D., summa cum laude, from the University of Minnesota.
The author wishes to acknowledge insights from his wife Molly and members of his book club with
whom he read and discussed Catch and Kill.
*
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INTRODUCTION

Ronan Farrow’s book, Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies, and a Conspiracy
to Protect Predators1 (“Catch and Kill”), is the story of his investigation of
Harvey Weinstein’s pattern of sexual harassment and assault, the challenge
of getting that story into print, and the other public figures whose similar
misconduct subsequently came to light. One could ask why lawyers should
be interested. Lawyers are central to the harrowing tale Farrow tells. In fact,
the book largely demonstrates that without the involvement of lawyers, often
acting at or beyond the boundary of ethical conduct, Weinstein and other
predators would have been exposed years earlier. Nondisclosure agreements
are also central to the story, helping the wealthy and powerful silence their
victims, hide their misconduct, and continue their predatory patterns. Reading the book forces consideration of the role of lawyers as moral and ethical
actors and whether nondisclosure agreements are contracts that should not
be enforceable. In short, the book is one that lawyers should read and carefully consider. That consideration must begin with the underlying story Farrow tells.

II. CATCHING A PREDATOR
The story begins with Farrow working as an investigative reporter for
NBC News.2 His reporting uncovered suggestions that Weinstein, a massively successful and politically connected movie producer,3 had engaged in
sexual harassment and even sexual assault.4 Beginning from the report by
actress Rose McGowan that Weinstein raped her, Farrow interviewed many
women who reported that Weinstein engaged in a pattern of sexual misconduct, ranging from harassment to rape.5 Once the surface was scratched,
Farrow uncovered that Weinstein’s history of sexually predatory conduct

1. RONAN FARROW, CATCH AND KILL: LIES, SPIES, AND A CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT
PREDATORS (2019).
2. Id. at 4–5.
3. Id. at 9–12.
4. Id. at 29–33.
5. Id. at 56–59, 93, 128–32, 167–70, 238–42, 245–46, 300–03.
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was widely known or at least suspected.6 However, attempting to expose
these stories into the open posed several severe challenges.
First, Weinstein built walls of silence around his victims through nondisclosure agreements.7 Leveraging his power to make or break entertainment industry careers, Weinstein pushed victims to accept cash payouts
paired with highly restrictive confidentiality clauses to remain silent.8 As a
powerful example, Weinstein pressured Italian actress Ambra Gutierrez to
sign a settlement agreement with a non-disclosure clause, which required her
to: (1) not disclose that Weinstein groped her; (2) to destroy any and all copies of recorded admissions made by Weinstein; (3) to allow Weinstein’s lawyers access to all her digital media; and (4) to sign a written statement—to
be released if she breached—declaring that none of Weinstein’s admitted
conduct occurred.9 Gutierrez told Farrow that when she signed the agreement, she spoke limited English, had been subjected to attacks on her character by Weinstein, and had deep concerns about the potential damage to her
and her family if she persisted in trying to hold Weinstein accountable for
groping her.10 The power of these contracts to purchase silence was intensified through the inclusion of financially oppressive liquidated damage
clauses for breach, and arbitration clauses that allowed confidential enforcement.11 Breaking through these walls was challenging.
Second, Weinstein applied intense pressure on his victims and media
outlets to prevent disclosure. He was dominant in the entertainment industry
and would blacklist those who did not bend to his will.12 His retaliation
6. Id. at 40–41, 52, 128–30, 251.
7. Id. at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252.
8. Id. at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252. These financial payouts were typically of
minimal consequence to Weinstein’s wealth, but had real consequences for young actresses and
media executives who faced the prospect that, if they challenged Weinstein, they might not work
again. Id. at 239–40.
9. Id. at 63–64.
10. Id. at 61–62. The media campaign waged by Weinstein was particularly vicious. It
drummed up claims that she was somehow involved in the corruption of Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi who carried on a series of affairs. Id. It was, as Farrow accurately described it,
purposeful “slut shaming” of Gutierrez through Weinstein’s media influence. Id.
11. Id. at 72.
12. Id. at 238–40. A prominent example was Weinstein telling director Peter Jackson that
he should not hire Mira Sorvino or Ashley Judd for The Lord of the Rings because they were “a
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against actress Annabella Sciorra may have prevented her from working in
film for three years.13 Weinstein also had deep political connections, particularly in New York.14 His connection to Bill and Hillary Clinton led to a
staff member for Hillary pressuring Farrow against pursuing the Weinstein
story.15 This was significant since Farrow had worked for Hillary Clinton at
the State Department.16 Connections within Weinstein’s team had more direct impact, as Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr., who chose not
to prosecute Weinstein for his sexual assault on Ambra Gutierrez, practiced
law with and received significant campaign contributions from lawyers
within Weinstein’s team.17 Weinstein pressured executives at NBC to prevent Farrow from pursuing the story personally and through intermediaries.18
Weinstein eventually engaged in direct pressure through a variety of contacts, threats of litigation, and cease and desist letters from his legal team.19
He also personally contacted Farrow’s sources to pressure them into silence.20 The more Farrow pushed for the truth, the more Weinstein’s machinery pushed back through licit and illicit channels.
nightmare to work with and we should avoid them at all costs.” Id. When Rose McGowan told
another studio that Weinstein had raped her, the studio promptly terminated her contract. Id. at
115.
13. Id. at 303–05.
14. Id. at 173–74. He had been a significant contributor to New York political figures
George Pataki, Kirsten Gillibrand, Eric Schneiderman, and Andrew Cuomo—covering state and
federal bases and both major political parties.
15. Id. at 11–12, 154–55.
16. Id. Clinton also became the only living secretary of state not to participate in an interview for a book on American foreign policy that Farrow was contemporaneously writing. Id. at
298–99.
17. Id. at 59–61.
18. Id. at 73–74, 108, 148–49, 178, 187–89. Weinstein’s pressure on NBC took a variety
of forms, including suggesting that Farrow had a conflict of interest because his father (film director
Woody Allen) had allegedly sexually assaulted Farrow’s sister and Farrow had supported her. Id.
at 188–89. Weinstein deployed others to suggest to Farrow that Weinstein could “clear things up”
and that he might be “taking action” in some fashion. Id. at 77–79.
19. Id. at 210–11, 213–15, 233–36.
20. Id. at 255–56.
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Weinstein’s pressure campaign was enabled by his ability to gather information about his victims and reporters through means of varying impropriety. Not least significant was his retention of the espionage firm, Black
Cube, to conduct surveillance and investigate Farrow while he was investigating Weinstein.21 Black Cube agents, retained by Weinstein’s law firm,
Boies Schiller,22 spied on Farrow, other journalists, and Weinstein’s victims.23 Black Cube used agents operating under false names,24 a “spy pen”
to record conversations,25 threats,26 and programs to “strip-mine” cell
phones.27 For this work, the firm was paid more than $1 million by Boies
Schiller on behalf of Weinstein.28 Black Cube, while the most nefarious, was
not the only firm Weinstein used.29 K2, another espionage firm that Weinstein used, conducted extensive background investigations of accusers, leveraging a “revolving door” of employees who moved from the Manhattan
District Attorney’s Office into private investigation work for wealthy clients
like Weinstein.30 Through this spying campaign Weinstein was able to track
the investigation almost to the minute and maintain a relative information
advantage.

21. Id. at 12–13, 310–21.
22. Id. at 95–96.
23. See id. at 314–15.
24. See id. at 319–20. This effort was particularly devoted to trying to get influence over
Weinstein victim Rose McGowan to derail the release of her book, which would detail her allegations. Id. at 318.
25. Id. at 365–68.
26. Id. at 328–29.
27. Id. at 319.
28. Id. at 315.
29. Id. at 326–27.
30. Id.
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Third, Weinstein employed a collection of connected and influential
lawyers. This included David Boies,31 Rudy Giuliani,32 Herb Wachtell,33
lawyers who had previously worked closely with Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr.,34 and Lanny Davis, long time legal “fixer” for Bill and
Hillary Clinton.35 Weinstein’s legal team also included civil rights lawyer
Lisa Bloom.36 Bloom’s involvement was noteworthy because she had represented several prominent sexual assault victims and was in regular contact
with Farrow about his investigation, but never disclosed that she was retained
by Weinstein.37 This team of legal powerhouses sought to exploit reputations, connections, and use intimidation to prevent the Weinstein story from
coming to light.38
Fourth, Weinstein engaged other media contacts in the practice of
“catch and kill,” which gave rise to Farrow’s book title. This worked most
extensively through American Media Inc. (“AMI”), the parent company of
tabloid newspaper The National Enquirer.39 The “catch and kill” practice
involves paying for a story, typically one damaging or critical of a public
figure such as Weinstein or Donald Trump, known as the “catch,” and then
not running it, known as the “kill.”40 Weinstein worked with AMI to silence
31. Id. at 12–13.
32. Id. at 60–62.
33. Id. at 124.
34. See id. at 75–76, 164, 221–22.
35. Id. at 91–92. Davis’s shady reputation was captured by Farrow’s partner’s observation
as to who might have a phone number for him, “I don’t know, Pol Pot?”
36. Id. at 234–37.
37. Id. at 71–74, 103–04, 120.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 16–20, 327–28.
40. Id. at 346–47. Again, non-disclosure agreements are a key part of the formula. The
purchase of stories was made exclusive and paired with agreements not to disclose. Id. at 332–36.
Thus, AMI effectively owned reality, or key portions of it. Id. at 344–45. With this came significant influence over public figures. Id. at 16–19, 336–38. AMI overtly acknowledged engaging in
“blackmail” to silence some stories to get to others. Id.
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some stories and disseminate others to advance his ends.41 Weinstein became enormously confident in his ability to control media coverage.42
Lastly, Farrow encountered resistance to his reporting from within
NBC News itself. As his investigation progressed, NBC News and NBCUniversal (the parent company of NBC News), grew increasingly resistant to
his reporting.43 Resistance came in several forms. One instance was based
on legal concerns such as tortious interference with contract claims based on
reporting from sources who breached non-disclosure agreements.44 Other
concerns were cultural, as some executives in NBC News seemed resistant
to creating controversy or complying with journalistic ethics.45 NBC News
resistance became so severe that Farrow was frozen out of additional work
for the network, was quietly released from his contract, and had to take the
Weinstein story elsewhere.46 He eventually got the story into print with The
New Yorker.47 Lawyers for the magazine rejected as absurd arguments about
tortious interference with contract and defamation that NBC News had capitulated to.48 When Farrow’s story eventually broke, NBC News was criticized for not maintaining good journalistic standards.49
The problem at NBC News, however, ran more deeply. NBC News
was severely compromised by the presence of sexual predators in its own
41. Id. at 54, 327–28.
42. Id. at 178, 231–32. Weinstein, after convincing NBC News to hold Farrow’s story,
bragged that he could certainly do the same with The New York Times which contemporaneously
investigated Weinstein. Id. He also bragged to people around him about his ability to dictate media
coverage he wanted. Id. at 108.
43. Id. at 64–65, 86–87, 118–19, 136–38, 141–43, 145–46, 153–54, 161–64, 179–80.
44. Id. at 65.
45. Id. at 176–78, 187–90, 197–99, 213–15, 275–77.
46. Id. at 228, 230–31.
47. Id. at 208–09.
48. Id. at 218–19, 234–36, 265–66.
49. Id. at 276, 289. Efforts Farrow made to not disparage NBC News broke down when
Rachael Maddow, host of an NBCUniversal owned network show, pressed Farrow about the refusal
of NBC News to run the story, and elicited the fact that the story had been ready and reportable but
NBC News declined to air it. Id. at 290–93.
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midst.50 It had used non-disclosure agreements to hide sexual harassment
and assault by Today Show host Matt Lauer, and executives involved with
the Weinstein story.51 Weinstein leveraged knowledge of the culture of sexual impropriety at NBC News to prevent his story from coming to light.52
The network faced a mutually assured destruction situation which led them
to put the brakes on Farrow’s reporting. Ultimately, NBC News had a culture of sexual assault, compelled silence, and prioritizing business over journalism that made reporting the Weinstein story difficult.53
Farrow’s reporting, standing alone, presents a disturbing tale. It involves horrible crimes by sexual predators, cowardice and complicity by
powerful figures, and failures of corporate integrity. Those realities alone
make Catch and Kill an important read. It is the central role of lawyers,
however, that makes it particularly important for them to read. The involvement of lawyers—both in failing to stop or affirmatively enabling misconduct—is a central aspect of the book.

III. WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?
The ethical lapses by attorneys surrounding Weinstein were legion—
many so glaring as to be impossible to be considered mere mistakes. Their
first area of misconduct is one of the most basic: conflict of interest. Lisa
Bloom and David Boies both had profound conflicts in the course of representing Weinstein.
Farrow knew Lisa Bloom because his sister, herself a victim of sexual
assault, had been publicly defended by Bloom during her case.54 Bloom had
also appeared on Farrow’s television show talking about sexual misconduct
cases involving celebrities.55 Farrow disclosed that he was investigating
Weinstein when, while generally discussing non-disclosure agreements in
50. Id. at 370–74.
51. Id. at 372–77, 390–93. It is easy to grossly understate Lauer’s misconduct. He had in
fact anally raped a subordinate co-worker who had been drinking and pushed her to keep quiet
about it. Id.
52. Id. at 395.
53. Id. at 398–400.
54. Id. at 71–73.
55. Id.
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sexual abuse cases, Bloom told Farrow it would be useful to know who they
were discussing.56 The conversation went so far as Bloom mentioning names
of potential lawyers to two of the victims Farrow had interviewed.57 During
his investigation, she periodically contacted Farrow with questions.58 She
also offered ideas on collateral stories and asked very specific questions
about whether Farrow had seen non-disclosure agreements and how many
witnesses he had.59
When Farrow’s story neared publication, he read a cease-and-desist letter from Weinstein lawyers with “a jolt.”60 Lisa Bloom was one of the lawyers representing Weinstein.61 When Farrow confronted Bloom she pointed
out that she had mentioned that she knew Weinstein and David Boies.62
However, Bloom never said she was working for Weinstein while “confidentially” consulting with Farrow, and she had contemporaneously entered
a book contract with Weinstein.63 Even at this point she tried to manipulate
Farrow, telling him, “you need to come in. I can help. I can talk to David and
Harvey. I can make this easier for you.”64 Bloom also suggested that Rose
McGowan, to whom she had previously provided names of possible counsel,
was “crazy.”65 The former victim advocate acted as a public relations flack
for Weinstein, seeking to portray him as the product of a different cultural
time and place who had engaged in “mild indiscretions,” not sexual assault.66

56. Id.
57. Id. at 73. Rose McGowan contacted one of the lawyers Bloom identified.
58. Id. at 74, 103–04, 120.
59. Id. at 103–04, 120.
60. Id. at 233–36.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 237.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 270–71.
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Bloom’s conduct was as unethical as it was inexplicable. Bloom consistently failed to disclose that Weinstein was a client while advising and
soliciting information from Farrow. She did not disclose her role when she
suggested lawyers to represent Weinstein accusers. This failure violated her
obligation not to imply, or at minimum, correct a clearly erroneous impression that she was disinterested.67 Bloom also had an obligation not to be
untruthful in assisting Weinstein to advance his fraudulent and criminal conduct.68 At a more general level, her communications with Farrow involved
acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.69
Weinstein’s primary lawyer, David Boies, likewise engaged in unethical conduct. He too labored under conflicts of interest, using the espionage
firm Black Cube to try and stop The New York Times from publishing a
Weinstein exposé while his firm represented the newspaper.70 This was a
direct conflict among current clients, a clear ethical violation.71 Retention of
Black Cube by the Boies Schiller firm was also ethically suspect given that
an expert Farrow interviewed said: “It’s impossible to do what they do without breaking the law.”72 At the direction of Weinstein’s lawyers, Black Cube
operatives used illegal means and violations of privacy rights to obtain information about his victims and investigators.73 This constituted fraud upon

67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). Her conduct
was potentially prejudicial to the administration of justice by preventing information of accusers
from coming to light and impeding the expeditious prosecution of Weinstein. Id. at r. 8.4(d).
70. FARROW, supra note 1, at 314–15.
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). Although less
certain on its face, it seems improbable that Boies could deploy an espionage firm against The New
York Times to disrupt the Weinstein reporting without using confidential information to its disadvantage. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (prohibiting disclosure of confidential client information except in limited circumstances); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (prohibiting use of information relating to client
disadvantage without written consent).
72. FARROW, supra note 1, at 315. Another Israeli based private intelligence firm told
Farrow that “[m]ore than fifty percent of what they do is illegal.” Id.
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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third parties,74 dishonesty, illegality, and general misconduct.75 Those violations were not obviated by the fact that they were conducted by third parties
working for Weinstein’s lawyers.76 It also appears that improper conduct by
Boies in relation to sexual predators was not limited to his work for Weinstein.77
Lawyers also facilitated suppression and destruction of evidence regarding Weinstein.78 The case of Ambra Gutierrez is a central example of
this. Gutierrez reported her 2015 sexual assault by Weinstein to police.79
Working with New York police, she obtained a recorded admission by Weinstein that he had groped her.80 Despite this, Gutierrez was subjected to grilling by prosecutors who eventually announced that the case would not be
prosecuted, much to the displeasure of the investigating officers.81 When

74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4.
76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a).
77. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., Jeffrey Epstein, Blackmail and a Lucrative ‘Hot
List’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/30/business/david-boiespottinger-jeffrey-epstein-videos.html [https://perma.cc/Z8AR-N2NL]. Ironically, The New York
Times reporting suggests that Boies engaged in later acts of questionable ethics in order to try and
rehabilitate his image after representing Weinstein. See id. Boies and John Stanley Pottinger intended to obtain footage produced by Jeffrey Epstein of sexual misconduct to submit demand letters
to prominent targets to leverage settlements with payments to charitable foundations. See id. Doing
so would involve pursuing claims of some questionable merit. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). It also arguably constitutes extortion. Stuart P. Green,
Theft By Coercion: Extortion, Blackmail, and Hard Bargaining, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 553, 573–74
(2005).
78. FARROW, supra note 1, at 285.
79. Id. at 56–57.
80. Id. at 57–58.
81. Id. at 59–60. Police described the questioning by prosecutors as being in line with what
they would have expected from Weinstein’s defense lawyers. Id. The Manhattan District Attorney
at the time was Cyrus Vance, Jr., who had extensive connections to Weinstein lawyers, including
Boies. Id. at 60–61.
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Farrow pursued her story, a line prosecutor reported that nothing in the investigation suggested Gutierrez was anything but truthful.82
Additionally, key evidence from the case inexplicably vanished. As
part of a settlement, Gutierrez had to surrender all copies of the Weinstein
confession to his lawyers.83 Law enforcement was not subject to that agreement, but the recording somehow vanished from the district attorney’s office
file.84 The recording was explicitly referenced in the investigation reports,
but missing.85 When Farrow sought comment from Weinstein, he was incredulous and outraged that a copy of the confession still existed.86 Weinstein’s team asserted that there was an agreement with the district attorney’s
office that all copies of the tape would be destroyed; district attorney’s office
personnel denied that claim.87 Whether an agreement was reached or not, it
is indisputable that Weinstein believed that there was a tape and that the tape
was not in the file. It is tough to find a more telling reflection of the arrogance and moral rot surrounding Weinstein than this angry and open assertion that a deal for the destruction of evidence of his criminal conduct was
not being honored.
Again, it appears that lawyers associated with Weinstein worked to violate the law and, by extension, their ethical obligations.88 More specifically,
it appears that Weinstein’s lawyers may have worked with prosecutors to
avoid a legitimate prosecution and destroy evidence of that crime.89
Moving one step beyond the outright destruction of evidence, Weinstein’s lawyers systematically facilitated hiding evidence through oppressive
non-disclosure agreements. The settlement agreement with Gutierrez
82. Id. at 55.
83. Id. at 63–64.
84. Id. at 66–67.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 285.
87. Id. Specifically, Weinstein’s representative asserted that the agreement was between
the district attorney’s office and “‘our law firm that the tape police had would be destroyed.’” Id.
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (explaining that
lawyers shall not “destroy or conceal” items of evidentiary value).
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provided for destruction of all evidence she possessed of Weinstein’s confession.90 Weinstein explicitly referenced a non-disclosure agreement with
one accuser to pressure Farrow against releasing his story.91 Weinstein’s
many agreements intended to keep evidence of his misconduct from ever
making its way into the world.92 In addition to these non-disclosure agreements, lawyers around Weinstein facilitated “catch and kill” contracts to
spike negative stories.93 While not illegal, these agreements suppressed access to evidence on a systematic basis. Because Weinstein’s accusers were
contracted into silence, law enforcement and journalists were precluded from
gathering evidence due to that silence and threats of legal action by Weinstein. This too was an ethically questionable preclusion of access to evidence
by his lawyers.94
A final ethical lapse by lawyers was the failure of corporate lawyers to
push back on cultures of sexual abuse and silence at Weinstein’s company
and NBC News.95 Outsiders identified “‘a large corporate conspiracy’” to
cover up Weinstein’s misconduct.96 Board members pushed back on Weinstein and attempted to bring his abuses to light, but lawyers, including the
ubiquitous David Boies, successfully resisted on his behalf for Weinstein.97
Likewise, at NBC News, the corporate machine was able to hide patterns of
misconduct by prominent on-air personalities and executives.98 This included using non-disclosure agreements to hide sexual harassment claims
against executives who suppressed the Weinstein story and news of Matt

90. FARROW, supra note 1, at 62–64.
91. Id. at 285.
92. Id. at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252.
93. Id. at 54, 327–28.
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(a).
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
96. FARROW, supra note 1, at 291.
97. Id. at 273–74.
98. See id. at 290–91.
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Lauer’s rape of a co-worker.99 Enabling this culture of silence pitted lawyers
directly against the openness and integrity expected of a journalistic outlet
and the best interests of the company.100 In the course of seeking to suppress
Lauer’s misconduct and that of others, NBC lawyers leveraged linguistic
technicalities to not admit settlements,101 intimidated victims with non-disclosure agreements,102 and pursued secrecy rather than openness and remedial action at the corporate governance level.103 NBC lawyers even tried to
pressure Farrow’s publishers to prevent the release of his unrelated foreign
policy book.104 When it involved one of their own, NBC News executives
and lawyers seemed to value protecting on-air talent, their careers, and
avoiding public embarrassment of the NBC brand more than journalism.
NBC lawyers and journalists seemed to be occupying very different cultures
when push came to shove.
What does this depressing litany of lawyer misconduct tell us? Some
important things, actually.
First and foremost, it reiterates the responsibility lawyers have as members of a profession that regulates itself. Professional responsibility begins
with individual lawyers knowing the rules and following them. When considerations like big fees, pleasing famous or powerful clients, or having public prominence are given primacy over ethical behavior, lawyers engage in
misconduct. The profession suffers as a result. It is impossible to say if
these concerns motivated Bloom, Boies, or NBC lawyers, but their lapses are
impossible to ignore. They are a cautionary tale to all lawyers to place professionalism first.
Compliance begins with individual lawyers; enforcement begins with
the profession. Lawyers themselves enforce the rules, including the

99. See id. at 174–75, 213–14, 375–77, 384–85.
100. See id. at 372–73 (recounting NBC counsel telling reporters that it would help NBC if
“the press” would stop covering Lauer’s misconduct); id. at 394–95 (recounting Weinstein efforts
to blackmail NBC News to suppress his story by threatening to expose Lauer).
101. Id. at 375.
102. Id. at 379.
103. See id. at 394–95.
104. Id. at 402–03.
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obligation to report serious misconduct.105 In the case of the Weinstein lawyers, however, the profession failed. No record of public discipline exists
for any of them.106 At some level, the failure of the profession to sanction
patterns of misconduct by lawyers, particularly prominent lawyers for the
rich and powerful, is a systemic failure as disturbing as the systemic predation of Weinstein and others. If professional responsibility—and the collective enforcement of it—breaks down in favor of secondary concerns, the legal profession risks being lost. If for no other reason, wrestling with this
question makes Catch and Kill a worthy read for any lawyer.
Second, the conduct of these lawyers reflects a failure to consider themselves as moral actors and leaders. Lawyers facilitating the conduct of sexual
predators through their work raises the question of their moral, not merely
legal, responsibility.107 Lawyers can take the view that their moral responsibility is limited to their role, meaning that the lawyer need only comply with
the client’s wishes and is not a moral actor beyond that.108 Certainly lawyers
around Weinstein and others appear to have limited their moral responsibility to carrying out the directives of their clients within the outermost boundaries of the law. The results demonstrate that when lawyers abdicate moral
responsibility, others can pay the price.
So too when lawyers fail to accept their responsibility as leaders.109
When lawyers fail to act as leaders, moral rot can occur around the clients
they represent and highly negative consequences follow.110 Lawyers must

105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer who
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”).
106. Many jurisdictions provide for private reprimand or other confidential disciplinary
measures. It is possible that this took place.
107. See Robert J. Muise, Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment
of Conscience, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 795–96 (1996).
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, DANGEROUS LEADERS: HOW AND WHY
LAWYERS MUST BE TAUGHT TO LEAD 3–4 (2018) (noting that lawyers have an obligation to lead
by speaking up to clients about the possible impacts of decisions).
110. See id. at 72–75.
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bring moral conduct to their work for clients.111 But all too often, moral
action is abdicated by lawyers.112 Lawyers have the ability to take responsibility and address the consequences of actions by their clients, manifesting
true leadership in doing so.113 Alas, the lawyers around Weinstein and NBC
News utterly failed to do so. They facilitated the worst impulses of their
clients when they could have been moral leaders. Their failure makes clear
the need for lawyers to be moral leaders and the enormous harm that can
come when they do not.114

IV. SHOULD SILENCE BE FOR SALE?
Farrow’s book is also a lens to look at the ongoing validity of nondisclosure agreements. Those agreements have had profoundly negative
consequences for victims of sexual misconduct. They allowed the conduct
of Weinstein,115 Matt Lauer,116 President Trump,117 and other powerful men
to be hidden from view. They allowed media companies like AMI to gain
blackmail power over public figures and affect public events as a result.118
Catch and Kill raises the question of whether these contracts should be allowed.119

111. DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 84–85 (2017).
112. See id. at 90–91.
113. Id. at 127–28.
114. THOMPSON, supra note 109, at 55–56.
115. FARROW, supra note 1, at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252.
116. Id. at 372–77, 390–93.
117. Id. at 346–47.
118. Id. at 16–19; id. 336–38.
119. It may be argued that preventing such contracts prevents parties to disputed claims
from keeping potentially embarrassing information to themselves. Parties who believe they will be
embarrassed or upset by the disclosure of information can simply choose to remain silent. For most
private citizens, this will likely be enough to maintain confidentiality. It is more complicated with
public figures, however. There is a greater interest to know about their private conduct, some
positive and some simply prurient. Even in the context of public figures, however, if the parties
keep the matter to themselves it is very likely that no one else will hear of it. Contrast the negative
effects of some public figures having their misconduct disclosed with the ability of public figures
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It is well settled that contracts can be unenforceable for reasons of being illegal or contrary to public policy.120 For contracts not made expressly
illegal by positive law, the question is whether the interest in their enforcement is outweighed by public interest against enforcement.121 Under the
common law doctrine the “public interest” of enforcing a contract is considered in the context of the values of the time and place, as well as the facts
and circumstances of the particular case.122 In different times and places the
doctrine has been used to invalidate contracts for gambling, prostitution, interference with business requirements or voting rights, divorce, or other
transgressions of “public morality.”123 The doctrinal touchstone has been
that if enforcing a contract hurts the public, it will not be.124
An increasing number of courts and scholars have wrestled with the
question of enforcing non-disclosure agreements in the context of sexual
misconduct.125 Beyond common law development, some legislatures have
considered or adopted statutes making non-disclosure agreements
to hide their misconduct on a systematic basis. The public harm of the use of widespread nondisclosure agreements outweighs the potential impact on individuals in their unavailability.
120. Sandra S. Baron et al., Tortious Interference: The Limits of Common Law Liability for
News Gathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1027, 1031 (1996).
121. Myanna Dellinger, Trophy Hunting Contracts: Unenforceable for Reasons of Public
Policy, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 424–25 (2016) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 778 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)).
122. Id. at 425–26.
123. Id. at 426–27.
124. Id. at 426.
125. See, e.g., Ryan Philp, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing Safety and Secrecy in NonDisclosure Agreements, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 845, 870–73 (2003) (discussing various scholarly
treatments of non-disclosure agreements and proposed balancing tests to determine their enforceability). It has also been suggested that such agreements should be assessed for reasonableness to
determine enforceability, much like agreements in restraint of trade are; Joan C. Williams et al.,
What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cascade, 2019 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 139, 198–201 (2019) (discussing application of “reasonableness” test to determine if nondisclosure agreements are enforceable in employment settings). Such a test would evaluate the
scope of the agreement, the context and purpose of disclosure, and the interests of employers, employees, and the public to determine enforceability; id. at 205–15. Certainly, given Farrow’s discussion of many Weinstein non-disclosure agreements as significantly power imbalanced transactions, almost contracts of adhesion, there is a serious question if they would hold up under such a
reasonableness review for enforceability.
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unenforceable against sexual assault victims or whistleblowers.126 At a critical juncture, the greatest contribution of Catch and Kill may be providing a
high profile demonstration of the enormous public costs of these agreements,
which can advance that debate. The costs are visible in several concrete
ways.
First, and most obviously, these agreements allow wealthy predators to
go undetected and unpunished. If not forever, certainly for the time necessary to add to their list of victims. Weinstein did.127 Lauer did.128 NBC
News executives did.129 The grim reality that purchasing silence is purchasing additional opportunity to offend is a heavy public cost which weighs
against allowing non-disclosure agreements regarding sexual misconduct to
be enforceable.130 By showing the public and policy makers how these
agreements allow predators to hide, Catch and Kill provides an important
contribution to the development of contract law.
Second, some of these contracts extended to conduct that was criminal.
While some of Weinstein’s accusers alleged “mere” sexual harassment, others alleged rape. Lauer’s victim described an anal rape.131 Criminal misconduct typically cannot be the basis of an enforceable non-disclosure agreement in any context.132 There is a valid question of why rapists should be
allowed to contract away evidence of their crimes. Stated differently, does
society want to allow contracts for conspiracies of criminal silence, particularly when that allows the underlying criminal activity to continue?
Third, these agreements have a significant deterrent effect on those who
might bring sexual abuse to light. Weinstein forcefully leveraged his agreements against NBC News, The New Yorker, and other media outlets to

126. David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165,
167–68 (2019) (discussing debate in New York and other jurisdictions).
127. FARROW, supra note 1, at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252.
128. Id. at 372–77, 390–93.
129. Id. at 375–76, 398–400.
130. Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 126, at 173–75.
131. FARROW, supra note 1, at 385.
132. Baron et al., supra note 120, at 1031.
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suppress reporting his misconduct.133 It certainly had a chilling effect on
Farrow’s reporting at NBC.134 Scholars conclude that tortious interference
claims against the media for reporting information subject to non-disclosure
agreements are probably not viable.135 Regardless of whether those cases
ultimately prevail, their threat can significantly deter reporting on sexual
misconduct as it did in the Weinstein case. Non-disclosure agreements appear to also have interfered with law enforcement in the Ambra Gutierrez
case.136 Catch and Kill documents how private non-disclosure agreements
can undermine the public right to know and obtain evidence of crimes
brought forward for prosecution. This weighs strongly against the enforceability of such agreements.
Fourth, use of these agreements as part of the “catch and kill” system
allows unscrupulous media outlets to obtain enormous leverage over public
figures.137 For example, AMI expressly acknowledged the blackmail power
this provided.138 The detrimental impact to the public can be seen in AMI’s
attempt to swing the 2016 presidential election by helping Michael Cohen
catch and kill the story of Stephanie Clifford’s affair with Donald Trump.139
Allowing elections or other important public events to be disrupted by the
intentional suppression of information has a destructive effect on the public.
By purchasing stories to control them, AMI could leverage individuals, highlight or hide stories based on how it helped the company, and control what
the “truth” is. These agreements let certain outlets gain an enforceable monopoly on stories. Paired with an impulse to leverage rather than report
them, it gives stunning power to those outlets. The possibility to abuse such
contracts is enormous and apparent. This too is a reason that “catch and kill”
agreements should not be enforceable.

133. FARROW, supra note 1, at 214–15, 217.
134. Id.
135. Baron et al., supra note 120, at 1032–35.
136. FARROW, supra note 1, at 285.
137. Id. at 16–19; 336–38.
138. Id. at 346.
139. Id. at 353.
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There are other public costs to enforcing these types of agreements.
They lead to increased employment turnover.140 They promote insecurity in
the workplace for other employees.141 The resulting culture can embolden
abusers and discourage victims.142 The social costs of such agreements are,
in short, very high. As a result, courts and some legislators have rejected
them.143 Catch and Kill is not presented against a blank slate. What should
be done with it?
Courts should recognize the void against public policy doctrine in this
context and apply it consistently. Appellate courts should synthesize and
clarify application of the doctrine. Practitioners and academic lawyers
should continue to raise awareness of the limited enforceability of agreements that seek to hide evidence of criminal conduct or whistleblower reports. Practitioners should consider if they are valid provisions to include in
contracts going forward. Lastly, legislatures should consider passing additional laws expanding and clarifying the limits on these agreements. Catch
and Kill is a valuable contribution because it shows in graphic and jarring
terms the importance of doing so. Lives are genuinely at stake.

V. UNHAPPILY EVER AFTER IN HOLLYWOOD?
It might seem surprising that a page-turner about Hollywood misconduct can usefully discuss a lot of practical issues that lawyers face. But
Catch and Kill does just that, and as a result, is an important book for lawyers
to read. It presents difficult issues of professional responsibility, leadership
and moral action, and contract law in stark fashion. Lawyers who read it will
be challenged to think about how to respond as individuals and as a profession to challenges of professional regulation, client management, and maintaining personal values. Any lawyer can use Catch and Kill to consider the
role of lawyers and the law as moral forces in business and society.
All these important questions are presented in a gripping, well-written
tale. A thinking lawyer’s page-turner is worth the time and effort. Catch
and Kill is such a book. Lawyers—and those with interest in the legal profession—would do well to take note.
140. Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 126, at 178.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 178–79.
143. Philp, supra note 125, at 872–74; Baron et al., supra note 120, at 1032–34.

FULTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/19/20 12:36 PM

ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO HIDE

415

EPILOGUE: THE WEINSTEIN CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
On February 24, 2020, a Manhattan jury convicted Harvey Weinstein
of first-degree criminal sexual act and third-degree rape.144 He was immediately remanded to custody.145 Weinstein was sentenced to serve twenty-three
years in prison after unrepentantly telling the court that his experience was
like those blacklisted in the communist scares of the 1950s.146 Separate prosecution for rape and sexual assault awaited Weinstein in Los Angeles.147 The
verdict, Weinstein’s sentence, and how they were arrived at is a necessary
coda to any consideration of Catch and Kill.
An inevitable, if simplistic, question about an event like this is: What
does it mean? What Weinstein’s conviction and sentence mean probably
depends on the perspective from which they are assessed.
For Harvey Weinstein, it means that a predator was finally brought to
justice (if incompletely, given that most of Weinstein’s victims were not part
of the case).148 Given that he was sixty-seven years old at the time of his
conviction, and had significant health issues almost immediately after being
sentenced, it may also mean that Weinstein spends the rest of his life in
prison.149 But it did not bring Weinstein to a point where he chose to apologize to anyone for anything.150

144. See Alan Feuer, 5 Takeaways From the Weinstein Verdict, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-rape-guilty.html [https://
perma.cc/7VF9-GLJB].
145. See id.
146. Jan Ransom, Harvey Weinstein’s Stunning Downfall: 23 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-sentencing.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/4NPZ-Q5MB].
147. Id.
148. Id. The sentencing judge noted that “[a]lthough this is a first conviction, it is not a
first offense. There is evidence before me of other incidents of sexual assault involving a number
of women all of which are legitimate considerations for sentence.” Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
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For Weinstein’s victims, his conviction and sentence bring some level
of closure,151 with his status as a sexual predator now a matter of record. But
that closure is not for all his victims nor without substantial costs.152 Pursuing justice against powerful predators was not easy for these women, nor
does the conviction of one predator alter the power equation for victims of
sexual assault by powerful men.153
For Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, the verdict adds to a
mixed legacy. Indisputably, the Weinstein prosecution and conviction
pushed the envelope of prosecuting powerful predators.154 It may pave the
way for more prosecutions of high-profile predators in the face of complex
evidentiary and legal issues,155 for which Vance’s office deserves praise.
However, the verdict necessarily revives questions about why Vance’s office
did not previously prosecute Weinstein on the force of the recordings obtained by Ambra Gutierrez and why the office dismissed other high-profile
sexual assault cases.156 For Vance, the conviction adds layers of complexity.
Weinstein’s conviction following a complicated investigation and trial
puts front and center the societal response to sexual assault and harassment.157 Several accusing witnesses had sexual relationships with Weinstein
after their assaults.158 Slut shaming survived the trial, even thrived actually,
as Weinstein’s lawyer Donna Rotunno argued that a conviction would promote “a universe that strips adult women of common sense, autonomy and

151. Megan Twohey & Jodi Kantor, With Weinstein Conviction, Jury Delivers a Verdict
on #MeToo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/us/harvey-weinstein-verdict-metoo.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/36SM-RD8D].
152. Id.
153. Rebecca Solnit, The Harvey Weinstein Verdict Is a Watershed—and a Warning, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/opinion/sunday/harvey-weinsteinverdict.html [https://perma.cc/9T8P-HLWX].
154. Feuer, supra note 144.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Solnit, supra note 153.
158. Feuer, supra note 144.
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responsibility.”159 That trope was rejected by the jury, however, and may be
losing social acceptance.160 On the other hand, women are not now simply
believed without reservation. The accusers in Weinstein’s trial were not uniformly accepted, and the testimony of actress Anabella Sciorra, key to getting Weinstein’s actions into public view, was particularly undercut on crossexamination as she could not recall months or even years of key events.161
Human recollection and communication remain uncertain dances, particularly in the fraught environment of sexual relationships. Ongoing questions
of consent, power, dynamics, and relationships that alternate between consensual and abusive remain complicated, and fact specific questions. It also
remains a reality that sexual relationships, workplaces, and gender perceptions in society involve complex questions of psychology, sociology, and
human nature. While Weinstein’s conviction may be a watershed moment
in the #MeToo movement, it is hard to say that it is the pivot point after
which these questions become clear or easy for anyone.162
Lastly, this is not the end of powerful men using their power for sexual
gratification or to impose silence on victims. Several other credibly accused
men in the entertainment and news industries remain free, if largely banished.163 Former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg’s entry into the
Democratic primary ensured that the use and enforceability of nondisclosure
agreements would be a significant issue in the second presidential election
in a row.164 Weinstein’s verdict was an individual conviction, not a societal
resolution.

159. Twohey & Kantor, supra note 151. Ms. Rotunno previously argued publicly that she
had never been a victim of sexual assault because she had the wisdom to never put herself “in that
position.” Id.
160. Id.
161. Feuer, supra note 144.
162. Twohey & Kantor, supra note 151.
163. Nicole Sperling, Harvey Weinstein Is Gone, but Hollywood is Still a Man’s World,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/business/media/harvey-weinstein-hollywood.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/LU4V-Q3KZ].
164. Amber Phillips, Bloomberg Now Says He’ll Release Women From Nondisclosure
Agreements. Here’s How Those Work, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2020, 1:51 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/20/warren-bloomberg-debate-nondisclosure-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/U6G4-2GME].
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In the end, Weinstein’s conviction and sentencing is perhaps the moment at which his movie begins to end. But for lawyers and society at large,
disturbing issues of sexual assault, abuse of power, unethical and unprofessional conducts, and espionage (both corporate and personal) are not a
movie. Even with this outcome, there is no “happily ever after,” at least not
yet.

